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Introduction 
This essay examines the role of expertise in the public debate on creative industries 
policy in the United Kingdom. Think tanks have been prominent in this. However, in the 
extensive literature on British think tanks, their relations with the fields of media, culture 
and communications have been completely neglected. This is a strange omission, given 
the centrality of these fields to public life – and not least, to the polity and economy.  
 
As well as addressing questions in public policy analysis, this article also contributes to 
the sociology of the intellectuals. It is the politico-intellectual field in which think tanks 
are situated - between universities and the political institutions. In that location, the 
connections between think tanks and news media (as well as the political system) are key 
because some key think tank players are also ‘media intellectuals’. The practice of think 
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tankery is above all about the mediation of ideas, and their brokerage in the public 
domain, with intended policy effects.  
 
We may argue, therefore, that think tanks – as producers of reproducible mediated 
discourse – are themselves part of a wider communications industry. Indeed, their 
personnel often gravitate towards the world of communications and cultural policy, and – 
not infrequently – they have various kinds of media background. Elsewhere (Schlesinger 
and Tumber 1994; Schlesinger et al. 2001), I have shown how news reporting is deeply 
enmeshed in the strategic action of sources as part of a wider argument against taking an 
exclusively ‘media-centric’ focus. The present analysis extends the examination of 
sources’ strategic action beyond the more usual focus on government, major institutions, 
enterprises and social movements to the think tanks themselves – which may (and usually 
do) have a variety of connections with each of the foregoing. 
 
Three main themes are addressed. First, some key historical moments in the evolution of 
think tanks in the UK in the wider context of the sociology of intellectuals. Second, that 
broader sociology is related to the ‘policy generation’ at the heart of New Labour in 
power, 1997-2008. Third, a case study of policy making is presented, showing how think 
tanks – and other forms of expertise – may contribute to the shaping of the policy 
process. The present focus on the struggle for power and influence of ideas-producers in 
the marketplace underlines the continued relevance of ideology (and therefore of 
ideology critique) for contemporary cultural analysis (Downey 2008). And while we limit 
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ourselves here to the peculiarities of the British, this study suggests a theme for the 
comparative analysis of policy expertise (cf. Stone and Denham (eds) 2004). 
 
I shall focus on the development of creative industries policy. Since the Labour Party 
came to power in 1997 ideas brokerage has turned this into a broader discourse on the 
‘creative economy’. These terms mark the difference between considering selected 
industrial sectors as constituting special objects of a common policy and regarding 
‘creativity’ as a fundamental shaping force for the entire economy. 
 
Think tanks in the UK 
The workings of think tanks – along with policy specialists in government, consultants, 
and lobbyists in the wider ‘policy community’ - may be analysed in terms of a sociology 
of knowledge and intellectuals in the present phase of modernity. Think tanks are not 
easily defined although an extensive literature attempts to offer viable categorisations. 
For present purposes, I take think tanks to be organisations that describe themselves as 
such and which are engaged in the production of policy discourses that make claims to 
knowledge. Those who work in think tanks, as policy advisers or consultants, are a tiny 
and select segment of the university-educated intelligentsia. They operate within elite 
circles where the costs of entry to knowledgeable policy discussion are high. Their 
exclusivity – or as Pierre Bourdieu (1986) would put it, their ‘distinction’ is based in the 
claims to expertise made by the thinktankerati. 
 
 4
In a major study of British think tanks, Diane Stone (1996) suggests that these be seen as 
‘independent policy research institutes’. Whether they are ‘independent’ is a matter of 
empirical judgement. For as Stone notes, the line between ‘policy analysis and advocacy 
does get blurred’ (1996:13), not least because think tanks engage in ‘building networks 
within policy communities and tailoring their product to the needs of decision makers and 
opinion leaders’ (1996: 23). Stone argues that think tanks occupy a strategic position in 
the ‘epistemic communities’ in which knowledge about policy is debated. Such 
‘knowledge based networks … articulate the cause-and-effect relationships of complex 
problems’ (1996: 37). Because think tanks operate within a highly structured market 
place for ideas, marketing and promotion are central to their quest for influence over 
government. Consequently, their ability to achieve resonance within the media is of 
central importance; they are a major resource for journalists (1996: 71).  
 
Stone suggests that we conceive of think tanks as having ‘influence’ rather than a direct 
impact on policy formulation; she argues plausibly that they have changed how policy is 
‘debated and decided’ and that ‘they help to provide the conceptual language, the ruling 
paradigms, the empirical examples that become the accepted assumptions for those in 
charge of making policy’ (1996: 110). 
 
Indeed, we can go beyond this to note that the terms of the discourse may become so 
compelling that not to buy into these is tantamount to self-exclusion (Schlesinger 2007). 
If those in charge of policy sing from their own hymn sheet, those who want policy to 
work for them are obliged to join the congregation in full voice. This is demonstrably the 
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case in the debate over ‘creativity’ that has dominated thinking about the cultural 
industries for more than a decade in the UK and which has increasingly been exported 
elsewhere by its exponents. 
 
Expertise and government  
Michael Schudson (2006: 499) has characterised an expert as ‘someone in possession of 
specialized knowledge that is accepted by the wider society as legitimate…What defines 
an expert as a sociological type is willingness to submit to the authority of a group of 
peers.’ Contrary to those who see expertise as a threat to democracy, Schudson (2006: 
500-501) sees it – ideally – as speaking truth to power, clarifying the grounds of public 
debate, and offering a diagnostic service. 
 
Schudson’s optimism needs to be tempered somewhat. The costs of entry to expertise 
create barriers between those with know-how and those without it. Experts advising those 
in power may lose their critical, democratic edge when faced by the seduction of power 
and influence. Furthermore, an educated public may not be able to muster the requisite 
arguments in forms capable of counterbalancing insider know-how. In short, being able 
to take one’s critical distance from expertise does still matter, given the continuing – and 
indeed, growing – importance of expert knowledge for the policy process. 
 
Think tanks, arguably, helped create the climate of ideas that aided the rise to power in 
the United Kingdom of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979 (Collini 
2006: 194). In reaction to Thatcherism’s ideologues, the New Labour opposition prepared 
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for the end of its seventeen-year exile from the levers of government by encouraging the 
growth of its own think tanks. Think tank formation and re-orientation is a lead indicator 
of impending political change.  
 
Contemporary policy expertise is deeply connected with modern party politics. As Rod 
Eyerman (1994: 106ff) has shown, ‘the formation of a new intellectual role – the 
professional expert’ in Britain – as elsewhere - occurred during and after the First World 
War. John Maynard Keynes was an exemplary case of a state expert in the field of 
economics who exercised global policy influence. He was also the progenitor of the Arts 
Council of Great Britain (ACGB), the key instrument of cultural policy delivery in the 
UK after World War II. Keynes’s model for the ACGB emerged from his longstanding 
and intense involvement in the artistic and intellectual milieu of the Bloomsbury Group. 
It also reflected his knowledge of the British state’s bureaucracy and of government’s 
ability to create intermediary bodies such as the BBC and the University Grants 
Committee, the models for the ‘arms length’ ACGB (Upton 2004).  
 
It was in the post World War II period that new style Conservative-supporting think tanks 
emerged: the Institute of Economic Affairs was set up in 1955; the Centre for Policy 
Studies in 1974; and the Adam Smith Institute in 1977. Although the precise impact of 
such ‘New Right’ think tanks is a matter of debate (Denham and Garnett 1998), arguably 
they inflected both the political discourse and shaped the intellectual terrain. Left-
oriented analyses, such as the ‘New Times’ arguments elaborated during the 1980s in 
left-wing monthly Marxism Today, were deeply influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s 
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conception of the struggle for hegemony. The issue was how to make both discursive and 
institutional responses to the prevalent neo-liberalism (Desai 1994). The goal of 
recapturing the ‘nation’ as a discursive object, the celebration of popular culture and the 
drive for constitutional reform came out of this moment (Hall and Jacques 1989).  
 
Colin Leys (2006) has argued that given regimes provide key background conditions for 
understanding how expertise is mobilised and articulated. Thus, in liberal/social 
democracies, a generalist civil service may call upon various kinds of public inquiry to 
provide external advice. Leys holds that state interventionism engendered the 
development of research departments and policy centres and a shared commitment to 
objectivity ‘in the sense that policy proposals should be judged on the basis of rational 
argument and sound evidence’ (2006: 3). The public domain is one in which 
‘professionals’ hold sway. Post 1974, monetarist thinking dominated during the global 
financial crisis and there was a marked shift to a neo-liberal policy regime. ‘Its key 
feature,’ argues Leys, ‘is that policy is now fundamentally about national competitiveness 
and responding to global market forces’ (2006: 2). Private sector secondments to 
government, special advisers and communications experts displaced the career civil 
service, which has been ‘radically reorganised on business lines, following the doctrines 
of the “new public management”’(2006: 5). According to this argument, more policy-
making opportunities have been created for the thinktankerati and other experts. For 




According to this argument, the rise of think tanks in the UK is part of a broader, long-
term movement in the mobilisation of expertise for purposes of government and in 
particular, for winning public policy arguments. ‘Professional’ policy expertise has 
counted at least since the early twentieth century (Schudson 2006). The composition of 
such expertise and the use made of it takes different forms according to the regime 
conditions in place.  
 
Alongside the evolution of institutionalised expertise in the broader policy community 
have come changes within government itself. The first think tank expressly installed at 
the heart of British government came at the behest of Conservative Prime Minister, 
Edward Heath. Set up in 1970, the Central Policy Review Staff (‘the Tank’ to insiders) 
was situated in the Cabinet Office and deployed a wide-ranging strategic agenda, 
working as an ‘outside consultant’ and ‘external catalyst’ (Hennessey 1990: 221-222; 
246). It survived until 1983. As an alternative to this Conservative-inspired body, also 
situated in the Cabinet Office, the Policy Unit was established in 1974 in Number 10 
Downing Street to support Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Two of the economic 
experts in the Policy Unit, Andrew Graham (b1942, adviser from 1974-79 and later a 
member of the Channel 4 TV board) and Gavyn Davies (b1950, adviser from 1974-76 
and 1976-79, and later chairman of the BBC from 2001-04) had an impact on 
broadcasting policy and practice, Davies particularly so (cf. Graham and Davies 1997). 
The Policy Unit is an instrument for the prime minister’s power operating, in one Cabinet 
Office insider’s words, ‘like the court of a king’.i  
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Labour was out of power from 1979 to 1997. From the late eighties, it began to equip 
itself for the battle of ideas. After a disastrous 1983 general election campaign, the party 
began to follow the painful road of ‘modernisation’ first under Neil Kinnock (who lost 
the 1987 and 1992 general elections) and subsequently under John Smith. Smith’s 
premature death in 1994 ushered in the present New Labour phase under the, often tense, 
duumvirate of Tony Blair, as Prime Minister and Gordon Brown as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Brown replaced Blair at Number 10 in June 2007.  
 
New Labour’s ‘policy generation’ 
Like their Conservative predecessors, New Labour-supporting think tanks have provided 
a cadre of recruits for advisory posts in government and also for ministerial careers. 
Second, they have been a space in which a new generation of politicians has been 
formed. Ron Eyerman (1994: 71, original emphasis) has observed:  ‘Intellectual 
generations…because of the linkage with cognitive traditions and the need for public 
expression connected with the role, exhibit particular characteristics.’ The group 
examined below has been shaped by all or some of the following: attendance at elite 
universities (mostly Oxbridge), early association with Labour’s ‘modernising’ drive to 
achieve success at the polls, policy analysis and development to fit in with this objective, 
time spent in the worlds of policy advice and/or management consultancy, and – often 
profound - exposure to cultural and communications policy and strategy issues.  
 
In what follows, I sketch connections between two key think tanks – Demos and the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) - and New Labour, to demonstrate how, for 
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individuals now highly prominent both in political and public life, these links have 
facilitated their career paths. I shall focus, first, on those who have mostly worked on 
media, cultural and communications policy issues, and second, by way of a case study, go 
on to delineate how these connections – and the use of expertise – have played into shifts 
in creative industries policy over the past decade. 
 
The first New Labour-sympathising think tank was IPPR, the Institute of Public Policy 
Research, established in 1988. Following Labour’s electoral defeats in 1983 and 1987, 
‘the impetus for establishing the IPPR came out of the need to recreate a modernising 
left-wing intellectual community, able to suggest new policies to solve problems caused 
or ignored by free marketeers, without alienating a moderate electorate’ (Ruben 1996: 
66). Patricia Hewitt (b1948), previously director of Liberty (the civil liberties lobbying 
group), was IPPR’s deputy director from 1989-94 and said to be the organisation’s 
driving force.ii Hewitt had earlier been press secretary for Labour Party leader Neil 
Kinnock from 1988-89 (Ruben 1996: 67), and involved in the first stage of the party’s 
‘modernisation’. She then headed research at Andersen Consulting from 1994 until 
elected to Westminster in 1997. She subsequently occupied several ministerial roles in 
the Blair governments, including Minister for Small Business and E-Commerce and 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. At the Department for Trade and Industry 
(DTI) Hewitt had presided over the creation of the new-style communications regulator, 
Ofcom, the Office of Communications. She left the Cabinet in June 2007 and while still 




The world of consultancy and think tanks impressed itself even more on the careers of a 
subsequent New Labour generation. Matthew Taylor (b1961) directed IPPR from 1999-
2003. From IPPR, Taylor went on to the Number 10 Policy Unit as Chief Adviser on 
Strategy to Prime Minister Tony Blair in September 2003. An Observer profile 
commented: ‘His decision to move to number 10 will confirm the widespread view that 
IPPR is merely “the New Labour civil service”’.iv Taylor moved on in November 2006, 
becoming Chief Executive of the Royal Society of Arts, the civil society and innovation 
fellowship. Even more than Hewitt, Taylor had a considerable Labour Party hinterland: 
from 1994 he ran the party’s ‘rapid rebuttal’ operation and centralised the policy-making 
machine. He was Director of Policy in the 1997 General Election campaign and then the 
Party’s Assistant General Secretary until December 1998. 
 
IPPR was also the starting point for the career of David Miliband (b1965), who became 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in June 2007, in Gordon 
Brown’s post-Blair 2007 cabinet. Miliband was a research fellow at IPPR from 1989-
1994. He had been Labour’s Head of Policy when Blair was the Leader of the 
Opposition, then becoming Head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit when Labour came 
into power. He was rapidly promoted in government 
(www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7463.asp; accessed: 3.5.08).  
 
There are other parallels to this career path. James Purnell (b1970) became Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport in July 2007 in Gordon Brown’s new cabinet. He had 
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previously been Minister for the Creative Industries. Purnell’s tenure at the Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was short-lived, as he was reshuffled due to a 
ministerial resignation in January 2008. However, while at the DCMS, Purnell was 
widely seen in policy and industry circles as extremely well qualified to undertake the 
post in virtue of his knowledge of media and communications policy and wide cultural 
interests. Purnell had worked as a researcher for Tony Blair, when in opposition. Later, 
he was Head of Corporate Planning at the BBC ‘before heading back as special adviser 
on the media in Tony Blair’s office…and there he helped outline the Communications 
Act’.v Purnell played a role in the IPPR research project that crystallised the idea of 
Ofcom as a ‘converged regulator’ (Collins and Murroni 1996).  
 
Purnell’s successor at the DCMS was Andy Burnham (b1970), also with a background in 
the policy field, having worked ‘as a research assistant to [Culture Secretary] Tessa 
Jowell and special adviser to Chris Smith, Labour’s first Culture Secretary, and the work 
he did paved the way for the Communications Act 2003 that transformed the regulation 
of the media industry’. Burnham has been a longstanding friend of Purnell’s, both having 
played for the New Labour football team.vi  
 
The other main think tank to provide New Labour policy personnel was Demos, set up in 
1993. Geoff Mulgan (who has a PhD in communications) developed the Demos idea 
along with Martin Jacques (once editor of Marxism Today). Mulgan worked as chief 
adviser for Gordon Brown in the early 1990s, then Labour’s trade and industry 
spokesman. IPPR was already on the scene and Demos’s founders ‘decided that it should 
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deliberately eschew too close an identification with the left of the party-political 
spectrum’ (Bale 1996: 23). In its heyday, Demos was seen as having an ‘effective media 
presence’ with access to the opinion-forming quality press that ‘would make the average 
university social scientist more than envious’ (Bale 1996: 29, 31). 
 
From 1997-2004, Mulgan ‘had various roles in the UK government including director of 
the Government’s Strategy Unit [for four years] and head of policy in the Prime 
Minister’s office’ (www/youngfoundation.org.uk/about/people/staff/geoff_mulgan; 
accessed 17.04.08). Mulgan (2006: 150) has described the government’s strategy units as 
internal departmental think tanks. Despite his background in communications research, 
he did not work directly in this area when in government. However, the Strategy Unit’s 
policy research on ‘public value’ - intended to provide theoretical underpinnings for 
public service reform - did have a major impact on the debate about the BBC and public 
service broadcasting more generally, as well as shaping much current discourse about the 
rationale for cultural policy. Mulgan left government in 2004 becoming Director of the 
Young Foundation, a social innovation institute. 
 
Mulgan has argued that ‘parties are now more clearly defined as users rather than 
generators of ideas’ (Mulgan 1996: 94; emphasis added). He has deemed both the 
universities and the civil service to lack policy firepower. Consequently, Mulgan (1996: 
96) suggests, ‘straddling institutions’ such as think tanks, consultants and major 
accountancy firms have become key advisors in government reform and public sector 
restructuring. Think tanks, Mulgan maintains, have secured a position in ‘intellectual 
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arbitrage’: ‘Successful and rising think tanks can convert political access into money, 
money into ideas, and ideas into legitimacy, and by doing so they can attract ambitious 
contributors’ (Mulgan 2006: 148). 
 
And indeed, access is key. The public face of thinktankery is concerned with airing ideas, 
in particular through media coverage. A much more discreet exercise of think tank 
influence lies in an ability to attract ministers and other key policy makers into seminars, 
thereby seeking to shape the terms of debate and provide personnel to advise on policy 
formation.  
 
Expertise may also be gained by working in the policy machinery of a major 
communications body, such as the BBC or Ofcom. The career paths of Ed Richards and 
Stephen Carter illustrate other options open to the New Labour policy generation. Inside 
Labour in opposition and later at the BBC, James Purnell worked alongside Ed Richards 
(b1966) – another member of the New Labour football team - who became Chief 
Executive of Ofcom in October 2006. Before Ofcom, where his first job was Chief 
Operating Officer, Richards had been Senior Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Tony 
Blair for media, telecoms, Internet and e-government. He took that role in 1999 after 
having been Controller of Corporate Strategy at the BBC.  
 
As Number 10’s media adviser (working with Burnham and Purnell), Richards helped 
draft the Communications Act that set up Ofcom. Before that, Richards had worked in 
consultancy for London Economics and – like Mulgan - also for Gordon Brown (Ofcom 
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2008). In 2002, when Richards was still at Number 10 Downing Street, the 
MediaGuardian listed him as number 15 in the roll call of media movers and shakers. By 
2007, Richards was in eighth place in the list, being described as a ‘quintessential New 
Labour man’; he retained that position in 2008.vii  
 
Richards’ predecessor as Chief Executive of Ofcom, Steven Carter (b1965), became 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s Chief of Strategy and Principal Adviser. After leaving 
Ofcom, Carter – who had always worked in the communications sector - became chief 
executive of Brunswick, the City of London public relations and lobbying firm from 
which he transited to Downing Street. His role at Number 10 was to reshape Labour’s 
communications strategy, in deep trouble when he was appointed in January 2008. The 
shift from Blair to Brown did not change the fundamental New Labour belief in political 
communications management.viii
 
A New Labour creation, Ofcom has been a noteworthy source of specialist expertise on 
communications, drawing in personnel who would otherwise work in academic research, 
think tanks, agencies or consultancies. Aside from providing pertinent experience for 
Carter’s transition to Number 10, as its experts have headed back into the market place, 
Ofcom has spawned second order expertise, for instance in the shape of Ingenious 
Consulting, which is focused on selling policy and regulation know-how.ix
 
To sum up, the New Labour policy generation has taken different (but closely related) 
routes to power. Four ideal typical career patterns look like this: 
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1. Labour party research/activism – think tank/policy adviser/BBC strategist – MP – 
Minister (Purnell, Burnham); 
 
2. Labour Party administration/senior adviser – think tank/consultancy –– MP - Minister 
– MP/company director (Hewitt); 
 
3. Labour Party activism/administration – think tank director/media intellectual – PM’s 
policy adviser – civil society organisation director (Mulgan, Taylor); 
 
4. Labour Party – communications company CEO – Ofcom CEO – communications 
company CEO - PM’s strategy adviser (Carter). 
 
From the creative industries to the creative economy 
My argument so far has been that a New Labour policy generation emerged strongly 
shaped by their origins in think tanks. Some of these became key players in the evolution 
of creative industries policy. Moving focus, we shall next consider the shift in policy 
conception from the ‘creative industries’ to the ‘creative economy’ over more than a 
decade of New Labour in power. Particular emphasis will be placed on the role of 
expertise in the Creative Economy Programme, from its initiation in October 2005 to the 




In a complementary study, I have analysed creative industries discourse as a product 
showing how it has acquired the look of an increasingly closed ideological system 
(Schlesinger 2007). In what follows, drawing on interviews with policy insiders, I shift 
the focus to the production of creative industries discourse and the use of various kinds of 
expertise to underpin ministerial needs for a policy ‘narrative’. I shall also illustrate how 
outside expertise may become subject to the stratagems of bureaucratic politics. 
 
Launching creative industries policy 
The UK government appears to have pioneered the idea of the creative industries in a 
European context. When New Labour entered office in 1997, the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS) was set up to replace the Conservatives’ Department of 
National Heritage. The first Secretary of State was Chris Smith (1997-2001), a 
protagonist of the new policy turn, who adumbrated some of the underlying thinking in 
his book Creative Britain (1998). Behind the scenes, key influences were the film 
producer David (later, Lord) Puttnam and John Newbigin, a special adviser to Smith from 
1997-2000. Andy Burnham was also working closely with Smith. 
 
Creative industries policy had its antecedents, particularly in earlier Labour ‘cultural 
industries’ thinking - to which Geoff Mulgan had contributed - which was heavily 




New Labour’s definition, first aired in the Creative Industries Mapping Document, 
published by the DCMS, proved astonishingly durable and has been widely exported. In 
1998, creative industries were defined as:   
 
‘[t]hose activities that have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which 
have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of 
intellectual property.  
 
These have been taken to include the following key sectors: advertising, architecture, the 
art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure 
software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and television and radio.’ 
(DCMS 1998: 3) 
 
Despite the more recent development of arguments about the ‘creative economy’, the 
thirteen sectors identified in 1998 remain an obligatory point of departure for debate in 
the UK and further afield. 
 
From the start, the logic of economic policy has prevailed. The core purpose of the Task 
Force set up by the DCMS was ‘to recommend steps to maximise the economic impact of 
the UK creative industries at home and abroad’ (ibid). 
 
The Task Force’s membership included representatives of 13 government departments or 
public bodies. Nine prominent ‘industry advisers’ came from publishing, music, 
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advertising, design, television and film (DCMS 1998: 4). Creativity policy became a 
national project, ‘branding’ the UK as at the global cutting-edge. Two key policy 
nostrums have been in play from the beginning.  
 
First, the UK is imagined as a competitive nation for which developing a ‘knowledge 
economy’ is key. Over the past decade, this line has become increasingly emphatic with 
the realisation that the ‘BRIC’ countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), present an 
increasing threat to high-end ‘creative’ activities. Education and training and their 
articulation with the creative industries, therefore, have become key policy arenas. 
 
Second, government intervention in the market, especially in establishing conditions that 
enhance company performance, is justified as helping to secure the knowledge base.  
‘Creativity’ – like innovation - has become a generalised value in itself, still largely 
unquestioned.  It is supposed to inform education at all levels and indeed, to become part 
of the warp and woof of organisational and personal life everywhere.  
 
Towards a new paradigm 
While creative industries policy enjoyed considerable attention at the start of Chris 
Smith’s period as Secretary of State, it gradually lost prominence as other major policy 
issues began to dominate the agenda. As one of Smith’s close collaborators noted: ‘Chris 
was very determined to get that creative industry agenda going on a broader front than 
just the DCMS’, although other departments lost interest quite quickly.x When Tessa 
Jowell became Secretary of State (2001-2007), she had to deal with the framing and 
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passage of the Communications Act 2003 and the BBC’s Charter Review (completed in 
2006). After Chris Smith’s departure from office following the 2001 general election, the 
focus shifted. As one adviser put it: ‘If you’re really looking at what it is that makes a 
difference, what are the levers that create policies, it’s always people and their 
passions.’xi Of course, ‘passions’ only explain so much, given the wider constraints on 
policy making; but they do account for differences of emphasis, to some extent. 
 
Creative industries policy achieved a renewed push only in October 2005, when Tessa 
Jowell signalled rekindled government interest in a speech. However, earlier, there had 
been straws in the wind. In June 2005, the Creative Industries Minister, James Purnell, 
speaking at an IPPR conference, had proposed that the UK become ‘the world’s creative 
hub’ (Roberts, 2006).   
 
In November 2005, at Purnell’s initiative, the DCMS launched the Creative Economy 
Programme (CEP), setting up seven working groups. Their composition reflected the 
established practice of drawing on a coterie of advisers. This was a weaker, lower profile 
re-run of the process initiated in 1998. Each of the working groups published a report: 
these covered infrastructure, competition and intellectual property, access to finance and 
business support, education and skills, diversity, technology, and evidence and analysis. 
 
Of especial interest is the rethinking of the original idea of the creative industries. Civil 
servants came to recognise – after a decade - that their own data were not robust enough 
for policy-making. They also came to acknowledge (at least implicitly) that the original 
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idea of the creative industries was too broad and needed refinement – for one, that it 
needed to be disaggregated, and secondly, that the policy building process had not been 
sufficiently self-critical. One veteran adviser thought that there had been serious flaws 
from the very start: 
 
‘It became a propaganda effort to persuade the whole of government to take creative 
industries seriously rather than [make] an intellectual effort to interrogate what was the 
necessary and desirable relationship between government policy and the evolution of 
these industries.’xii  
 
Confirming this, one Treasury source accepted that little was known about the key factors 
driving the creative industries.xiii It is not surprising that a rethink was on the cards. Work 
undertaken conducted by the consultancy, Frontier Economics, for the CEP’s evidence 
and analysis group distinguished between those parts of the creative industries engaged in 
‘production’ (such as publishing and broadcasting), those that could be classified as ‘arts 
and crafts’ (such as performing arts and antiques) and those providing ‘services’ (such as 
advertising and architecture). But even these groups were seen as overlapping. In 
essence, this work –– argued that the ‘13 CIs for which DCMS is responsible’ fell into 
‘three broad industry types’ (Frontier Economics 2006: 8). A similar critique came from 
NESTA (the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts), which also 
underlined the conceptual shortcomings of the DCMS’s original definition and 
emphasised the precise targeting of advice, support and investment to specific sectors 
(NESTA 2006).  
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Alongside these analyses, the CEP mobilised several kinds of expertise. First, 
‘stakeholder’ know-how was brought into six of the seven working groups. This echoed 
the practice of the first creative industries task forces. However, unlike its predecessors, 
which had conscripted prominent figures from the commercial and business worlds, the 
groups were overwhelmingly drawn from public sector bodies. In industry circles (and 
among some of those actually involved) this recruitment was seen as reducing the 
credibility of the exercise. 
 
The CEP’s working groups produced a series of interim reports. Some ideas were floated 
and then simply disappeared. Others survived in the circulatory system of policy making. 
For example, the idea of a ‘creative summit’, branding London as the ‘global hub for 
creativity’, endured until publication of the DCMS’s strategy document in February 
2008. 
 
The CEP was refocused once again when Purnell was moved to another department. 
According to insiders, his replacement as Creative Industries Minister, Shaun Woodward, 
was very keen to make his mark. Woodward was unhappy with the outcomes achieved so 
far by the CEP working groups and wanted a new ‘narrative’. This is typical of 
ministerial change: one government adviser pertinently described ministers as 
‘marketeers’ engaged in ‘marketing ideas to the public in order to win elections and 
they’re marketing ideas to industry and officials to see them implemented’.xiv  
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Woodward called in an old colleague from his BBC days, Will Hutton, director of the 
Work Foundation, a research and policy consultancy. In the early Blair years, Hutton, a 
former editor of The Observer, and a regular economics columnist, had published The 
State We’re In, a diagnosis of the UK’s ills, which enjoyed a brief vogue in New Labour 
circles (Hutton 1995). Woodward ‘wanted a State We’re In for the creative industries’, 
according to a source close to the action. Reflecting subsequently on his task at a creative 
industries ‘summit’ organised by NESTA on 15 February 2008, Hutton said that it had 
been an ‘intriguing commission’ for an outsider to write such a strategic analysis.  
 
The Work Foundation team (which drew on NESTA’s expertise) worked out its ideas 
during Spring 2007. Informants inside the DCMS readily acknowledged the key role of 
the Work Foundation’s research team in thinking through a new conceptual framework.xv  
 
The underlying tensions in the drafting process surfaced in June 2007. I had been told 
that the DCMS firmly intended to publish a ‘Green Paper’ by then. However, two sets of 
difficulties arose. The department (like others in Whitehall) was expecting ministerial 
changes in the wake of Gordon Brown’s appointment as prime minister in succession to 
Tony Blair. The civil servants therefore held their fire. This was the ‘official’ reason 
offered for the delay.  
 
However, there were other considerations. The Work Foundation had had disagreements 
with civil servants about how to shape their report. The team (according to an insider) 
had been ‘deliberately ambiguous’ about where the arguments were heading. The Work 
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Foundation’s aim was to keep controversy at bay while the project was completed. 
However, senior officials had considerable reservations about the team’s analysis and 
recommendations. Repeatedly, in interviews with key players, I was told that tensions 
had arisen over the clash between ‘blue skies’ thinking and the pragmatics of realisable 
policy.xvi
 
The Work Foundation’s report finally emerged late in June 2007 and it was not, contrary 
to what had been bruited, ‘twinned’ with a government strategy paper (Work Foundation 
2007). As a government-commissioned document, Staying Ahead had needed ‘clearance’ 
before publication. Questions had arisen over which departments would actually endorse 
it. In the end, only the DCMS did so, in the shape of Secretary of State Tessa Jowell’s 
foreword. That same month, James Purnell replaced Jowell.  
 
Partly as a result of this ministerial change, the DCMS’s own strategy paper did not see 
light of day until 22 February 2008. Titled Creative Britain (DCMS 2008), it was 
published as a ‘partnership’ document with the Department for Innovation, Universities 
and Skills (DIUS) and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR). It carried a foreword by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. Its title simply 
reprised that of Chris Smith’s book, which might be judged to be either an hommage or, 
less charitably, a total failure of imagination. 
 
The document underwent no less than five drafts since the previous summer. According 
to one DCMS source this work had been done in-house; in fact, a trusted external adviser 
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made a major input into the initial drafting.xvii The civil service wanted to take its 
distance from the Work Foundation’s vision. Relations had not always been easy. One 
Treasury source underlined the ‘difference between a think tank and the policy making 
process’. True, the team had produced ‘a very good think tank piece but it couldn’t ever 
be published as a government document’, a view echoed by others.xviii  A source in DIUS 
laid blame for the CEP’s ultimate lack of policy weight on the Work Foundation.xix 
Others said the team had little understanding of policy-making processes or detail and 
officials had needed to ask for more evidence. On the Work Foundation’s side it was 
observed that the officials had wanted more recommendations and those provided had 
been misunderstood. Implied criticism of ‘short-termism’ and the shortcomings of 
financial markets had set off alarm bells in the civil service as Staying Ahead had been 
perceived as too interventionist and critical of the creative industries.xx
 
In part, the Work Foundation had encountered a more general disenchantment with think 
tanks and consultants. One DCMS source reflected that after more than ten years in 
government:  
 
‘The gene pool is drying up a bit. We’re at the third generation of people coming in from 
think tanks to be special advisers and half the Cabinet started off in think tanks and that 
means that the expertise inside government is such that there’s less appetite to ask Will 
Hutton to write a report.’xxi
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To compound the difficulties, there had also been differences of view between the two 
key departments involved, the DCMS and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 
subsequently BERR). When the CEP began, the DTI had considered that much of it 
‘effectively’ covered its own territory of ‘support for small businesses, access to finance, 
regulation and competition…the heart of economic things for DTI to be very much 
actively engaged in and quite possibly leading on.’xxii The CEP therefore had to be a joint 
project. The DTI/BERR had insisted that it ‘owned’ software, whose economic impact 
officials felt was understated by the DCMS. The DTI/BERR took a generally sceptical 
line, questioning whether the creative industries were unique and regarding the Work 
Foundation’s report as not convincing. Furthermore, the 13 creative industries were not 
seen as bound together and while it was worded cautiously, inside DTI/BERR, the figures 
the Work Foundation had assembled were judged (on the basis of what the industries 
themselves had reported) to have inflated the creative component of software production 
and publishing.  
 
If such scepticism about the DCMS’s position were not enough, the Work Foundation 
team themselves saw the department as having uneasy relations with the Treasury and 
had asked a Treasury adviser assigned to help the research team to keep their own lines 
open. DCMS officials had been unhappy about this, wishing to control communication 
about the project themselves. 
 
The long and winding road to publication of Creative Britain encountered other 
complications. Margaret Hodge replaced Woodward as Creative Industries Minister in 
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June 2007. Hodge was seen as importing ‘DTI scepticism’ to the post and reported as 
taking some time to ‘buy in’ to the creative industries. Extending the delay was a further 
round of ministerial changes early in 2008. On 24 January, James Purnell was again 
moved from the DCMS in an unscheduled ministerial change. Andy Burnham, who had 
been a DCMS adviser to Chris Smith, replaced his close friend Purnell.  
 
The UK government’s strategy paper - Creative Britain: New Talents for the New 
Economy - certainly accorded with the dictates of practical politics rather than blue skies 
thinking.  According to one key figure involved in the drafting, it was ‘a significant step 
forward’ by ‘properly integrating education, training, skills and economic policy’. 
However, it was conceded that the CEP had not established ‘this sector of the economy as 
a real heavyweight player’. The Work Foundation had envisaged a radical new 
conception of an economy with creative activity at the core. What emerged instead was a 
plethora of stitched-together policy proposals already in the machinery of DIUS, BERR 
and the DCMS.xxiii  
 
Conclusions 
Governments use various forms of expertise to fly kites and to inform the policy 
formation process. In a double movement, ministers both aim to secure their own 
legitimacy by seeking expert solutions and at the same time - when flying kites - to shift 
responsibility for new thinking outside the governmental machinery. Although we should 
be cautious in making inferences from just one case study, a number of characteristic 
features of the policy process may be identified. 
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First, a small number of actors may act as the effective protagonists of a policy. At any 
one time, there are preferred suppliers of ideas and evidence. While there have been 
intellectual antagonists able to raise fundamental questions about whether creative 
industries policies actually work or whether the intellectual framework itself is 
meaningful and robust, these criticisms have not had any significant impact on how 
policy is conceived. At the same time, there has been no shortage of conceptually 
compliant interests jostling for advantage. Indeed, what is most apparent is the Hallelujah 
Chorus of self-sustaining approbation. This has come from the ‘gurus’ who have 
profitably marketed the concepts, the consultants who have worked to their briefs, and 
much of the UK’s academic community researching or teaching the creative industries. 
 
Second, creative industries policy-making has been characterised by turf wars so what 
emerges is an outcome of interdepartmental compromise. Contrast Staying Ahead (2007) 
and Creative Britain (2008) to illustrate this point. Continual intra-governmental 
competition is hard to discern if we limit ourselves simply to reading the products of 
policy discourse which typically constitute a lattice-work of conformity to a small 
number of policy prescriptions underpinned by a belief system. 
 
Third, at given moments in the life of a government, ministerial ‘ownership’ of policies is 
important for the focus achieved by particular areas of activity. As we have seen, such 
assertions of ownership may be for reasons of personal advancement or – more 
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honourably - because of a deep familiarity with a given area and a belief that it really 
matters. 
 
Fourth, while in small departments such as the DCMS, officials may need outsiders to 
develop the broad lines of policy thinking, civil servants are also protective of their own 
space and in particular their own need to find workable and practical solutions that enable 
them to implement policy. The DCMS had to manage the scepticism about its initiatives 
that abounded in larger and more important ministries such as DIUS, DTI/BERR and the 
Treasury. Where work has been commissioned that doesn’t quite fit the bill – as in the 
case of the Work Foundation’s Staying Ahead – bringing in a trusted ‘fixer’ to rework the 
text is one option. 
 
Last, there are intriguing hints in the account given above of how a policy field – and its 
underlying political generation may ‘mature’. Some of those involved in policy advice – 
who began their careers in think tanks – have now taken their distance from them, and 
while they do not necessarily deny their origins, they may disparage their previous 
occupation from a position of insider influence. To put it differently, one form of 
expertise has made its necessary transition. The equivocal status of think tankery has 
been refined into practical political knowledge, embodied in ministers who have 




This work is based on research undertaken for an AHRC-funded project on ‘Creativity: 
policy and practice: a study of the UK government, the BBC and the UK Film Council’ 
ID No. 112152. Thanks to my co-investigators, Simon Frith and Richard Paterson, and 
also to Gillian Doyle and the IJPP’s reviewer for their critical comments. 
 
References 
Bale, Tim. 1996. ‘Demos: Populism, Eclecticism and Equidistance in the Post-Modern 
World.’ In Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain, eds Michael David Kandiah, 
and Anthony Seldon. Volume 2. London: Frank Cass. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London 
New York: Routledge  & Kegan Paul. 
Collini, Stefan. 2006. Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Collins, Richard and Murroni, Cristina. 1996. New Media, New Policies: Media and 
Communications Strategies for the Future. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Desai, Radhika. 1994. ‘Second-hand dealers in ideas: Think-tanks and Thatcherite 
Hegemony.’ New Left Review (203): 27-64. 
DCMS. 1998. Creative Industries Mapping Document. London: Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport. 
DCMS. 2008. Creative Britain: New Talents for the New Economy. London: Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport. 
Denham, Andrew and Garnett, Mark. 1998. British Think-tanks and the Climate of 
Opinion. London: UCL Press. 
 31
Downey, John. 2008. ‘Recognition and the renewal of ideology critique.’ In The Media 
and Social Theory, eds David Hesmondhalgh and Jason Toynbee. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Eyerman, Ron. 1994. Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Frontier Economics. 2006. Comparative Analysis of the UK’s Creative Industries: Report 
to DCMS. 3 August. London: Frontier Economics. 
Graham, Andrew and Davies, Gavyn. 1997. Broadcasting, Society and Policy in the 
Multimedia Age. Luton: University of Luton Press. 
Hall, Stuart and Jacques, Martin. 1989. Eds  New Times. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Hennessey, Peter. 1990. Whitehall. London: Fontana Press. 
Hutton, Will. 1995. The State We’re In. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Leys, Colin. 2006. ‘The cynical state.’ Socialist Register 2006. 
http://socialistregister.com/recent/leys [accessed: 5 August 2008] 
Mulgan, Geoff. 1996. ‘The market place of ideas.’ In Ideas and Think Tanks in 
Contemporary Britain, eds Michael David Kandiah, and Anthony Seldon. Volume 2. 
London: Frank Cass. 
Mulgan, Geoff. 2006. ‘Thinking in tanks: the changing ecology of political ideas.’ The 
Political Quarterly 77(2): 147-155. 
NESTA. 2006. Creating Growth: How the UK can Develop World Class Creative 
Industries. London: NESTA. 
 32
Ofcom. 2008. ‘Ed Richards: Chief Executive Officer’, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/ofcom_board/biogs/e_richards [accessed: 28 March 
2008]. 
Roberts, Paul. 2006. Nurturing Creativity in Young People: a Report to Government to 
Inform Future Policy. London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 
Ruben, Peter. 1996. ‘The Institute for Public Policy Research: Policy and Politics.’ In  
Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain, eds Michael David Kandiah and 
Anthony Seldon. Volume 2. London: Frank Cass.  
Schlesinger, Philip and Tumber, Howard. 1994. Reporting Crime: The Media Politics of 
Criminal Justice. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 
Schlesinger, Philip, Miller, David and Dinan, William. 2001. Open Scotland? Journalists, 
Spin Doctors and Lobbyists. Edinburgh: Polygon. 
Schlesinger, Philip. 2007. ‘Creativity: from discourse to doctrine?’ Screen 48(3): 377-
387. 
Schudson, Michael. 2006. ‘The trouble with experts – and why democracies need them.’ 
Theory & Society 35(5-6): 491-506. 
Smith, Chris. 1998. Creative Britain. London: Faber and Faber. 
Stone, Diane. 1996. Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy 
Process. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 
Stone, Diane and Denham, Andrew Eds. 2004. Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research 
and the Politics of Ideas. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 
Upton, Juliet. 2004. ‘John Maynard Keynes, the Bloomsbury group and the origins of the 
arts council movement.’ International Journal of Cultural Policy 10(2): 203-217. 
 33
Work Foundation, The. 2007. Staying Ahead: the Economic Performance of the UK’s 

















                                                 
Endnotes 
i Personal communication, 23 May 2008. 
ii Interview, 4 April 2008. 
iii Wray, Richard (2008) ‘Hewitt takes her telecoms experience to BT’, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/mar/btgroupbusiness.telecoms/print [accessed: 
24 July 2008] 
 34
                                                                                                                                                 
iv Rowan, David (2003) ‘Matthew Taylor profiled’, The Observer, 7 September, 
http//:david.rowan.com/2003/09/observer-matthew-taylor-profiled.html [accessed: 27 
July 2008] 
v Thomas, Liz.2007. ‘Right man for the job?’ Broadcast 6 July: 20. 
vi Chris Tryhorn and Owen Gibson. 2008. ‘The reality of a dream job.’ MediaGuardian 
28 January: 1-2. 
 
vii ‘15 Ed Richards’, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/jul/08/mediatop100200240/print [accessed 28 
March 2008];  ‘8. Ed Richards’, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/jul/09/mediatop1002007.mondaymediasection7/
print [accessed: 28 March 2008]; ‘8. Ed Richards’,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/jul/14/mediatop10020087/print [accessed 14 July 
2008]. 
viii Hinsliff , Gaby. 2008. ‘Get Carter! Why Gordon Brown sent for the master fixer.’ The 
Observer 23 March: 28-29;  Wintour, Patrick. 2008. ‘New strongman at No 10: Brown 
hires a high-flyer to help him get back on course.’ The Guardian 8 January: 4. 
ix Gibson, Owen. 2008. ‘A 2+2=5 situation.’ MediaGuardian 31 March: 5. 
x Interview, 7 April 2008. 
xi Interview, 7 April 2008. 
xii Interview, 7 April 2008. 
xiii Interview, 8 April 2008. 
xiv Interview, 7 April 2008. 
xv Personal communication, 12 June 2007. 
 35
                                                                                                                                                 
xvi Interviews, 7-8 April 2008. 
xvii Interviews, 15 February 2008 and 7 April 2008. 
xviii Interview, 8 April 2008. 
xix Personal communication, 28 May 2008. 
xx Interview, 8 April 2008. 
xxi Interview, 7 April 2008.  
xxii Interview, 26 June 2007. 
xxiii Contrast the figure of the ‘stylised typology’ of the creative industries in Staying 
Ahead with that of the ‘creative hub’ in Creative Britain to get the measure of the shift. 
